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This paper discusses the merits of wealth transfer taxation on both efficiency and equity grounds. 
It first deals with the popular debate that is dominated by American economists. This debate 
concerns  the  US  estate  tax,  which  is  one,  among  many,  types  of  wealth  transfer  tax.  After 
addressing the main issues prevailing in this debate and discussing the lack of popular support for 
such tax, the paper adopts a more theoretical approach to explore the pluses and the minuses of a 
wealth transfer tax. The main point is that the desirability of a wealth transfer tax depends on the 
motives of wealth accumulation and transmission. 
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Taxes are rarely popular but those on wealth transfers are particularly controversial. A 
number of countries are without an inheritance or an estate tax and some contemplate to phase it out 
in the near future. Opponents of the "death tax" as they have dubbed it claim that it is unfair and 
immoral. It adds to the pain suffered by mourning families and it prevents small business from 
passing from generation to generation. Because of many loopholes, people of equivalent wealth pay 
different amounts of tax depending on their acumen at tax avoidance. It hits families that were 
surprised by death (and it is therefore sometimes called a tax on sudden death). It penalizes the frugal 
and the loving parents who pass wealth on to their children, reducing the incentive to save and to 
invest. 
Supporters of the tax, in contrast, retort that it is of all taxes the most efficient and the most 
equitable. They assert that it is highly progressive and counterweighs existing wealth concentration. 
They also argue that it has few disincentive effects since it is payable only at death and that it is fair 
since it concerns unearned resources. For a number of social philosophers and classical economists, 
estate or inheritance taxation is the ideal tax. 
Clearly, death taxation more than any other generates controversy at all levels: political 
philosophy, economic theory, political debate and public opinion. The truth probably lies between 
these two opposite camps. For economists this tax like all taxes should be judged against the two 
criteria of equity and efficiency to which one could add that of simplicity and compliance. 
The paper is organized as follows. It first deals with the popular debate that is dominated by 
American economists and which only concerns the US estate tax, one, among many, type of wealth 
transfer tax. It also discusses the lack of popular support for such a tax. Then the paper adopts a more 
theoretical approach to explore the social desirability of a wealth transfer tax.
4 The main point is that 




2. The US estate tax debate. 
2.1. 2010 
“Give a dog a bad name, and hang him.” 
Few topics in US tax policy rival the estate taxation as a subject exhibiting simultaneously a 
considerable level of passion and a substantial degree of confusion. There like elsewhere tax analysts 
have a limited sense of humor. Yet, these last months they indulge themselves into the joke that 2010 
may be the best year for wealthy Americans to die -- at least from their heirs' point of view. Strangely 
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enough federal estate taxes are due to go to zero in 2010 unless Congress acts. Current law exempts 
the first $3.5 million of an individual's estate, and then taxes the value above that at a maximum rate 
of 45 percent. In 2010, the tax disappears entirely before reverting in 2011 to an exemption for only 
the first $1 million of the estate with a top rate of 55 percent above that level. 
The pro and the con camps are furbishing their arms with the hope to push the President and the 
Congress to go their way. In that confrontation, the camp of the con is clearly the more vocal and the 
more aggressive. Just looking at the Google entries shows much more items from opponents to the 
estate tax than from advocates. In November 2009 a forum on the subject was organized in 
Washington by the conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute and the moderator started 
by the statement: "It comes roaring back for people who die in 2011. Some people joke about 
wealthy people being killed off by their heirs in 2010." 
In this paper we will show what kind of tax on wealth transfer a social welfare maximizing 
government ought to choose. But before let us see the kind of arguments the two camps exchange, 
particularly the critics. Opponents to the estate tax remind us of these people who criticize a dish 
such as the “Coq au vin” arguing that the last one they tasted was made with corked wine, that they 
did not eat it because they are vegetarian and that it was too expensive. Those three points are not 
without relevance but they miss the point. The same can be said of the estate tax. Most of the 
critiques are addressed to the way it is administered rather than to the idea of taxing wealth transfers. 
2.2. Standard critiques. 
Critics contend the tax distorts investment and other choices of the rich, and also affects owners of 
small family businesses. It raises very little revenue at a heavy cost to the economy. It generates 
complex tax avoidance schemes. The hardest hit by the tax are farmers and small business people 
who work hard to pass on an enterprise of value to their children. From a number of recent 
publications, we have listed a number of charges addressed to estate taxation in a sample of writings 
that are often more partial and polemical than balanced and rigorous.
5 
The arguments against the estate tax. 
•  It reduces the stock of capital in the economy 
•  It is a leading cause of dissolution for family businesses 
•  It obstructs environmental conservation 
•  It is a « virtue tax » that penalizes work and thrift in favor of consumption 
•  It is ineffective at reducing inequality 
•  It has little effect on charitable giving. 
•  It raises very little, if any, net revenue 
•  It is complicated, unfair and inefficient 
 
None of these charges is entirely irrelevant or completely wrong but at the same time is totally 
correct.  It is true that estate tax does not raise considerable sums for the federal government. It 
makes up about 2% of total federal tax proceeds. But at the same time 2% is not that negligible. It is 
clear that inheritances only explain part of wealth inequality and that further wealth and income are 
not perfectly correlated. Thus even a well functioning tax on wealth transfers would only have a 
reduced impact on income inequality.  It remains that it has some impact. It is well established that 
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estate taxation violates principles of horizontal equity. People with the same estate can pay different 
taxes depending on the asset structure, the fiscal engineering employed, the suddenness of death, the 
degree of conviviality within the family. Yes, but that calls for reforming the tax and not necessarily 
killing it. We all know that heirs can be asset rich but cash poor. This is the case of small business 
owners who can be stuck with impossible tax burdens. In this respect it should be remembered that 
family-owned businesses and farms may be valued in a special way that reflects the current use to 
which the property is put, rather than its market value. It is possible that the effect of estate tax 
deductibility on charitable contributions has been overstated. It remains that it has a positive effect 
and in any case fostering charitable contributions should not be one of the main missions of estate 
taxation. One of the tenets of a fair tax system is that income is taxed only once. Income should be 
taxed when it is first earned or realized, it should not be repeatedly re-taxed by government. The 
estate tax violates this tenet. However, in the theoretical section we show that this argument  of 
double taxation is not correct. Further, capital gains income is not taxed until the income is 
"realized," that is, until the assets are sold. If an asset is held until the owner dies, the gain in the 
value of the asset is never subject to capital gains tax or any other tax. Finally there is the alleged 
harmful effect of estate taxation on the environment. It is hard to believe that some sort of 
arrangement between the heirs and the State could not avoid it. 
 It is interesting to observe a gap between popular publications and rigorous public finance 
economics. In the first ones, one can read statements such as:  
« A full repeal of the death tax would create 1.5 million jobs. This is half the number of jobs 
President Obama claimed the $800 billion stimulus package would create--at one-fifth the price. 
Additional benefits from full repeal of the estate tax include: 
•  Increasing small business capital by over $1.6 trillion; 
•  Increasing the probability of hiring by 8.6 percent; 
•  Increasing payrolls by 2.6 percent; 
•  Expanding investment by 3 percent; and 
•  Slashing the current jobless rate by 0.9 percent. » 
6 
It is needless to say that these forecasts are too rosy to be credible. 
On the contrary most public economists while acknowledging the negative supply side effects 
of estate taxation would compare them with those of other taxes and would not recommend 
abolishing it. In any case, the final decision is in the hands of voters and in the US these do 
not seem favorable to estate taxation. 
 
 
2.3. Unpopular taxes 
A large numbers of surveys have been conducted in the US on whether or not the estate tax should be 
repealed. As these surveys show, estate taxes are not popular taxes, even though they typically hit 
only a minority of the population. They affect fewer than 2 percent of decedents and are therefore of 
no direct concern to most taxpayers.  
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Recently the AEI (2009) provided what can be considered as the most comprehensive 
collection of polls ever compiled on the subject of taxes. In this document there is a section 
on estate taxation with a list of surveys that are consistently in favor of the repeal of the tax. 
Let us mention two examples. In questions asked by CBS News/New York Times pollsters 
after the estate tax threshold was raised to $3.5 million, around four in ten said the tax should 
be eliminated altogether. In a 2006 question by Harris Interactive for the Tax Foundation, 
people said the estate tax was the worst federal tax, ahead of the federal income tax. In 2009, 
more people said the federal estate tax was not at all fair than gave that response about any of 
five other federal taxes.   
 
  Estate taxation is so unpopular that Auerbach (2006) writes, "it might make little sense 
at the moment to argue in favor of the estate tax in the United States".  Most recent Public 
Finance or Public Economics textbooks do not even mention those taxes. Data are scarce with 
the exception of those coming from OECD. (See e.g. OECD (2008)). 
   
  On the issue of unpopularity, Frank (2005) argues that the way questions are phrased in 
opinion polls is of crucial importance. He shows that voters would not favor repealing the 
estate tax if they took into account the policy changes that such a reform would necessarily 
have to entail (raising other taxes, cutting government services or increasing federal 
borrowing). When asked just about repealing the tax without mentioning its repercussions, 
respondents do favor the repeal by almost three to one. When respondents are reminded that 
the revenue shortfall would have unpleasant repercussions, these respondents opposed repeal 
by almost four to one. There is also the way questions are framed. In a recent paper, Fatemi, 
et al. (2008) demonstrate that prior counter attitude reverses the expected framing effects. In 
sum, when respondents do not initially approve of an estate tax, favorable frames lead to more 
negative responses than do unfavorable frames.  
  
  Along the same line, Birney et al. (2006) analyze the polling data and show how the 
contours of public opinion were strategically used in the policy debate.  When the issue was 
framed as a matter of fairness, misperceptions of self–interest and principled beliefs about 
fairness combined to yield apparently overwhelming support for repeal. However, when it 
was instead framed as a matter of priority, majorities supported estate tax reform options over 
repeal. Interest groups used the ﬁndings about public opinion in coalition–building and 
campaigns that changed the public image of repeal from extreme to mainstream. In sum, 
public opinion polls supporting repeal provided “running room” for politicians to vote for 
repeal. Krupnikov et al. (2006) examine whether the broad support for repeal of the estate tax 
is a result of citizen ignorance. They ﬁnd that increasing information about the estate tax or 
politics in general has very different effects on Republicans and Democrats. They also show 
that standard surveys overestimate the extent of misinformation about the estate tax and 
conclude that  “ignorance” is not a compelling explanation of why so many people support 
estate tax repeal.  
 
To conclude this section, it is clear that the estate tax such as implemented in the US is 
subject to a very effective and active campaign of disparaging and is unpopular even among 
people who will never be subject to it, themselves or even their descendants. Let us mention 
some standard explanations for this puzzle. First, there is clearly the way survey questions are 
framed and the intense lobbying activities of the opponents to the estate tax. There is also, the 
way the tax is organized with its numerous loopholes. which give a feeling of huge horizontal 
inequalities. But clearly there is something more in it which is outside of the scope of an 
economist. The estate tax seems to touch upon family values that are so important in the 	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
culture of American society and to remind people of something they want to forget about, 
death. As far as family values are concerned estate taxation is perceived as a tax on 
transactions within the family and therefore as a kind of intrusion in privacy. As to the denial 
argument the problem can be the same as that behind the annuity puzzle. Accordingly, very 
few people do not buy annuities even though this would be a rational move. This is because 
they want to avoid a double penalty: early death and wasted investment. This prospect is not 
by far compensated by the alternative outcome: late death and high return from annuities. In 
the case of estate taxation, people want to avoid the double loss: death and death tax. This 
prospect is so repugnant that many individuals neglect the simple fact that at death they will 
not have any estate deserving to be so taxed. 
 
3.  Types and importance of wealth transfer taxes. 
 
3.1. Types of wealth taxation. 
   Most of the writings on wealth transfer taxation are based on the US setting. It is important 
to realize that the US estate tax is just one type of wealth transfer tax. There exist two major 
types of taxes levied on wealth: those applied sporadically or periodically on a person's 
wealth (net wealth taxes), and those applied on a transfer of wealth (transfer taxes). These 
taxes are presented on Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Wealth Taxes 
Form                   Examples 
Net Wealth Tax   Periodic 
  Sporadic (capital levy) 
Transfer Tax 
Transferor-based     Estate tax, gift tax, unified tax 
Recipient-based   Inheritance tax, gift tax, accessions tax 
 
Net wealth taxes are typically assessed on the net value of the taxpayer's taxable assets (i.e., 
value of assets minus any related liability), either sporadically (often known as "capital 
levies") or on an annual or other periodic basis. Net wealth taxation has almost disappeared 
everywhere except in very few countries including France. In this survey we study transfer 
taxes. These taxes are typically assessed on the net value of the taxable assets transferred, and 
fall into two basic categories: those levied on the donor, more precisely on his estate (typical 
in common law countries), and those levied on the recipient, namely the heir. 
    Donor-based taxes can be levied separately on inter vivos transfers (gift tax) and on 
transfers at death (estate tax), or together in a single integrated tax. Recipient-based taxes can 
also be levied on inter vivos transfers (gift tax), on transfers at death (inheritance tax), and on 
an integrated basis (accessions tax). The most common approach to taxing wealth transfers 	 ﾠ 8	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among OECD countries is an inheritance tax. The US is somewhat unusual in applying an 
estate and gift tax. 
3.2.  Importance and evolution. 
    OECD (2008) provides data on wealth transfer taxation for the period 1965--2006. We will 
restrict our presentation to EU15, the US and Japan with Figure 1 and Table 2, which give the 
size and the evolution of the wealth transfer tax over the period 1965--2006. As it appears 
from these figures wealth transfer taxes play only a minor role in the total tax revenues of 
countries. Within our sample of OECD countries in 2006, Belgium, Japan and France reach 
with respectively 1.39, 1.06 and 1.04 percent, the highest shares in total tax revenues. In 
Portugal, by contrast, the share is less than 0.2 percent and is the lowest. Sweden and Italy 
have abandoned it. As one sees from Figure 1, both the US and the UK experienced a huge 
decline, from 2.62 to 0.74 and from 2.06 to 0.89 respectively over the last four decades. 
France has experienced an increase with a peak in 1995. 
Table 2 
Estate. inheritance and gift taxes has a percentage of total taxation 
 
Figure 1 
Estate. inheritance and gift taxes  as a percentage of total taxation. 1965--2006 
 
3.3. Estate versus inheritance tax 
    In general, estate taxation gives one total freedom to bequeath one's wealth to anyone or 
anything. Disinheritance is possible, as long as the decedent prepares an explicit will. 
Inheritance taxation, on the other hand, often comes with the legal obligation to bequeath 
one's wealth to one's children, if any, and with an equal sharing rule for most of the estate. 
Donors have some freedom to allocate a small fraction of the estate, but this fraction declines 
with the number of children. As the relation between recipient and donor gets more distant, 
the inheritance tax rate increases. 
    The relative merits of the estate-type and the inheritance-type taxation are clear. The first is 
simple and relatively easy to administer, leaving all discretion to donors to dispose of their 
wealth as they wish. This means that it is possible to compensate some children over others 
for differences in income or need, and that it is possible to disinherit one's children. By 
contrast, the inheritance tax is more equitable than the estate tax in that it lightens the tax load 
of large families. Yet, it does not allow for compensatory treatment of children with uneven 
endowments. 
    Basically, estate taxation reflects a concept of the family and of the state that is quite 
different from the one that governs inheritance taxation. If one trusts parents to be fair in 
disposing of their estate, and if one believes that intrafamily inequality is as important as 
interfamily inequality, then what is desirable is a combination of freedom of bequest and a 
very low estate tax. 
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4. What do we learn from public economic theory? 
We now turn to what public economic theory teaches us as to the desirability of wealth 
transfer taxation. And we start by looking at the reasons why people save and bequeath. 
 
4.1 Wealth accumulation and transfer motives. 
 
    It is now widely agreed that to understand the allocative and distributional effects of wealth 
and wealth transfer taxation one needs to have a better grasp of the saver's motives. Among 
these motives, one has to distinguish those which are purely selfish and those which concern 
intergenerational transfers (gifts and inheritance). 
    We examine briefly a number of motives that have been offered in the literature and sketch 
their implications. The first two motives are purely selfish. The last three concern bequests. 
Consumption smoothing 
    This is the most traditional motive for saving over one's life-cycle, with or without 
uncertainty. It includes the need of replacement income after retirement, financing of 
children's education, precautionary saving and self-insurance. It is well known that this kind 
of saving decreases with social insurance and tends to be smaller when individuals are short-
sighted. In case of imperfect annuity markets and "premature" death, part of life-cycle saving 
is not consumed and leads to what is called accidental or unplanned bequests. This form of 
bequests is by its nature unaffected by estate or inheritance taxation.
7 
Preference for wealth 
    It is today widely agreed upon that neither life-cycle saving nor bequests motives can 
explain the top tail of the wealth distribution. This brings us back to Max Weber's theory of 
"the spirit of capitalism" generalized by Kurz (1968): capitalists accumulate wealth for its 
own sake. To cite Weber (1958, p. 53): "Man is dominated by making of money, by 
acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer subordinated 
to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal relationship, so 
irrational from a naive point of view, is evidently a leading principle of capitalism." As 
argued by Carroll (2000): "the saving behavior of the (American) richest households cannot 
be explained by models in which the only purpose of wealth accumulation is to finance future 
consumption, either their own or that of heirs." Then, to explain such a behavior one has to 
assume that some consumers regard accumulation as an end in itself or as channel leading to 
power which is equivalent to assume that wealth is intrinsically desirable, what we call here 
"preference for wealth". 
Pure dynastic altruism: altruistic bequest
8 
    Parents care about the likely lifetime utility of their children and hence about the welfare of 
future generations. Consequently, wealthier parents tend to make larger bequests. Conversely, 
holding parent's wealth constant, children with higher labor earnings will receive smaller 
bequests. When there are no rules restricting freedom to testate, there is also a tendency for 
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7 Abel [1985], Davies [1981]. 
8 Becker and Tomes [1979], Barro [1974]. 	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
parents to leave different amounts to different children, in order to equalize their incomes. 
Finally, pure altruism typically leads to the Ricardian equivalence: parents compensate any 
intergenerational redistribution by the government through matching bequests. In 
consequence, debt and pay-as-you go social security have no effect on capital accumulation. 
Joy of giving: paternalistic bequest (bequest-as-last-consumption)
9 
    Parents here are motivated not by "pure" altruism but by the direct utility they receive from 
the act of giving. This phenomenon is also referred to as "warm glow" giving. It can be 
explained by some internal feeling of virtue arising from sacrifice in helping one's children or 
by the desire of controlling their life. Formally, these bequests appear in the utility function as 
a consumption expenditure incurred in the last period of life. Ceteris paribus, they are subject 
to income and price effects but do not have any compensatory effect, namely they are not 
intended to smoothen consumption across generations. A crucial element is whether what 
matters to the donor is the net or the gross of tax amount. In the first case, we can talk of some 
type of altruism; in the second, we rather have a selfish attitude: the donor being concerned by 
what is given and not what is received. 
 Exchange-related motives: strategic bequests
10 
    In their canonical form, exchange-related models consider children choosing a level of 
"attention" to provide to their parents. In exchange, parents "remunerate them" through a 
prospective bequest. The exchanges can involve all sorts of non-pecuniary services and they 
can be part of a strategic game between parents and children. Strategic bequests, as they were 
originally presented, imply that parents extract all the surplus from their children by playing 
them against each other. Strategic or exchange bequests depend on the wealth and the needs 
of the donor; they are not compensatory between parents and children and they do not need to 
be equal across children. 
Existing evidence on wealth accumulation motives. 
 
There is a long history of research on bequest motives
11. Initially researchers obtained widely 
divergent estimates. For example, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) estimated that only 20 
percent of bequests are accidental. Hurd (1987) countered that households with children do 
not save more and, on this basis, concluded that bequests largely stem from life cycle savings. 
Nevertheless, over time the literature appears to have reached a fragile consensus. Altruistic 
transfers appear to represent a minority of wealth transfers. The remainder would be egoistic, 
purely accidental or based on either exchange considerations or selfish joy of giving.  
 
4.2.  Desirability of taxation. 
We now turn to the desirability of taxation, particularly that of wealth transfer for each type of 
wealth accumulation motives. Our theoretical discussion of wealth taxation will be organized 
in two stages. First of all, we assume that there are neither bequest motives nor preference for 
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wealth. In that case, within the standard overlapping generations model there is no distinction 
between wealth and capital income. Then bequest motives and preference for wealth are 
introduced. In other words, it is recognized that saving is not motivated solely by retirement 
or precautionary concerns. We show that these other motives may have a significant impact 
on the rate and on the structure of taxation. 
4.2.1. Pure life-cycle considerations. 
 In this subsection we examine two propositions that lead to zero taxation of capital income. 
The first one, called the Atkinson-Stigliz proposition, is discussed within the overlapping 
generations model. The second one, known as the Chamley-Judd theorem, is presented in a 
model with infinitely lived individuals. 
4.2.1.1. The overlapping generation model 
    The overlapping generations model is the conventional setting to discuss capital income 
taxation when saving is exclusively motivated by consumption smoothing. It considers 
finitely lived generations that overlap, along with an infinitely lived government.
12 We use the 
two-period model, with labor supply in the first period and consumption in both the first and 
second periods. Saving from first-period earnings is used to finance second-period 
consumption, generating capital income that is taxable (in the second period). Since there is 
only a single period of work, the model can be viewed as shedding light on the taxation of 
saving for retirement. This model allows for introducing the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976) 
(hereafter AS) proposition. It states that when the available tax tools include nonlinear labor 
income taxes, taxation of saving or of capital income is not optimal if two key conditions are 
satisfied: (1) preferences are (weakly) separable between consumption and labor and (2) all 
consumers have the same utility function.  
    To counter the AS result and its zero capital income taxation there are several angles of 
attack. The first one is clearly to question the assumption of separability or that of 
homogeneous preferences. Dropping the assumption of separability would not necessarily 
result in taxing capital income. Subsidizing is as likely. Introducing heterogeneity in 
preferences appears to be more promising. It has been done in different ways. There are at 
least three potential sources of heterogeneity that can lead to a tax on capital income: time 
discount rates, longevity and initial endowments. Saez (2002) questions the Atkinson-Stiglitz 
theorem on the basis of differences in time preferences across individuals with different skills. 
He shows that capital income taxation becomes desirable under the plausible assumption that 
those with higher earnings abilities discount the future less (and thus save more out of any 
given income). Cremer et al. (2009) use another stylized fact, namely the positive correlation 
between income and longevity to reach the same conclusion. Cremer et al. (2003) introduce 
an endowment (inherited wealth) as second unobservable characteristic. They show that if 
ability and endowment are positively correlated then it is efficient to tax capital income. 
    If we discuss the AS proposition in the standard OLG setting, we have to keep in mind that 
there is no guarantee that the optimal accumulation of capital is achieved. If the government 
does not have direct control of capital, it can use tax policy to affect the capital labor ratio. In 
that case, even with separability and identical utilities, a tax on capital income is needed. This 
in itself is quite intuitive. However, the design of the appropriate tax rule is more complex. 
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For instance, a need of additional capital accumulation, because the capital stock is below the 
modified golden rule level, will not necessarily lead to less taxation of capital income and 
more taxation of labor income. What matters is aggregate saving and this may depend much 
more on net of tax earnings than on the rate of interest. 
    Another variation of the standard model is to allow for uncertain earnings in the second 
period of life. Cremer and Gahvari (1995) have shown that if consumption decisions are to be 
taken before earnings uncertainties are resolved then the Atkinson-Stiglitz result fails to hold. 
Banks and Diamond (2009) discuss the implications of this result for capital income taxation. 
They argue that the case of uncertainty is similar to the situation (discussed above) where 
high wage individuals discount the future less. In the latter case, a high wage individual 
imitating someone with less skill saves more than a low wage individual. Taxing capital 
income is then an effective way to release an otherwise binding incentive constraint. Under 
uncertainty, this argument goes through. An individual who plans to earn less than the 
government planned amount in the event of high skill has a higher valuation of saving than 
the individual with the government planned income level. Consequently, a tax on savings 
continues to relax an incentive constraint. To illustrate this argument, Banks and Diamond 
(2009) point out that retirement age tends to be smaller for those with higher savings. 
Consequently, taxing savings discourages earlier retirement. 
    Uncertain earnings are a central element of what is known as the New Dynamic Public 
Finance. This literature is quite complex and leads to a number of interesting insights. 
However, the basic case for taxation of capital income is based on the same argument as in 
Cremer and Gahvari (1995). 
 
4.2.1.2. Infinite horizon 
    In the above models there is a contrast between finitely lived individuals, who are 
intergenerationally disconnected, and the government which has an infinite horizon and a 
different time preference. Let us now look at another class of models wherein individuals are 
infinitely lived and have the same discount rate as the central planner. For the purpose at hand 
the central finding of this literature, due to Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), is the optimality 
of zero capital income taxation in the long term. 
    The intuition behind this result can be understood by looking at the wedge that a capital 
income tax introduces between the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and the 
intertemporal marginal rate of transformation (MRT). Let us illustrate this through a simple 
example. 
 Take a tax rate of 30% and a rate of return of 10%. In a year, the wedge between MRS 
(=1+0.1(1-0.3)=1.07) and MRT (=(1+0.1)=1.1) is small and the distortion on the saving 
choice is negligible. After 40 years, the capital income tax generates a 67% wedge between 
consumption today and consumption in 40 years. As a matter of fact, as the time horizon T 
goes to infinity, the ratio between MRS  and MRT  tends to zero. Consequently, when the 
investor has a very long time horizon the capital income tax becomes extremely inefficient. 
    The Chamley-Judd no capital income taxation conclusion has become the standard rule for 
a number of public economists and particularly macroeconomists. It has also be challenged on 
various grounds. It relies on a set of strong assumptions. As with the Atkinson-Stiglitz result, 
a key question is how robust their theorem is to realistic changes in the model. There is first 	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the steady-state assumption; we know that during the transition capital income is subject to 
taxation. There is also the assumed equality between the private and the social discount rate 
and the absence of liquidity constraints. If one departs from these assumptions the tax is not 
any more equal to zero even in the steady state. Their model assumes also that there are no 
constraints on the tax tools. As shown by Coleman (2000) and Correia (1996) as soon as some 
taxes are constrained the zero tax result ceases to hold. 
    Uncertainty about earnings, along with borrowing constraints is shown to lead to a positive 
tax. See on this Chamley (2001) and Golosov et al. (2003). Finally let us mention a paper by 
Saez (2002) who introduces a progressive tax on capital income into the Chamley-Judd 
model. Under some plausible assumptions, he shows that such a tax is desirable; it drives all 
the large estates down to a finite level thus generating a truncated long-run wealth 
distribution. 
    To conclude this subsection, it seems that the case for a zero-tax on capital income when 
the only motive for saving is life-cycle consumption smoothing is rather weak. While 
Atkinson-Stiglitz, on the one hand, and Chamley-Judd, on the other hand, are often invoked 
to advocate a tax exemption on capital income, there appears to be a striking discrepancy 
between common beliefs and actual results. Under closer scrutiny, it is clear that either of 
these zero tax results does not apply under "plausible" circumstances.
13 
4.2.2. Wealth transfers with or without bequest motives. 
4.2.2.1 Altruistic bequests 
We first consider the case where individuals save for their own retirement consumption needs 
and for making sure that their children's welfare is sufficiently high. The standard way of 
dealing with this problem is to adopt the infinitely lived individuals model. Instead of 
considering an infinite series of years of one individual life we consider an infinite series of 
generations (a dynasty), which are linked by bequests. We assume non negative bequests, 
which corresponds to the liquidity constraint in the infinitely lived individuals model, and 
equality between the social and the individual discount factors. Then, one has the Ricardian 
equivalence implying the neutrality of the debt.
14 One also has the Chamley-Judd result. That 
is a zero tax on inheritance , but as we have just seen this result is subject to so many 
qualifications that it is not useful. 
4.2.2.2. Paternalistic bequests 
 These bequests are also called "bequests as last consumption" or "joy of giving" bequests. To 
obtain the social optimum, there is the issue of whether or not individual utilities should be 
"laundered"
15. Harsanyi (1995) and Hammond (1988) have advocated "excluding all external 
preferences, even benevolent ones, from our social utility function". Advocates of a utilitarian 
approach, on the other hand, argue that the social planner cannot paternalistically modify 
individuals' preferences. Besides laundering there is the question of what is the argument of 
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the parental utility function: before or after tax bequests. Quite clearly laundering and taking 
as argument the before tax bequests make a good case for a positive tax. 
    Bequests are potentially subject to a double tax: first, the tax on savings, and then the 
specific tax on transfers. This latter tax depends on the extent of laundering. When there is 
laundering, bequests lose their direct social utility and are thus subject to a relatively higher 
tax. In the absence of laundering it is not impossible to have a negative marginal tax. For 
example, Fahri and Werning (2009), who do not launder their utilities, study efficient 
allocations in a model with altruistic parents and focus on the implications of not laundering 
for estate taxation. They show that the optimal estate tax rate is likely to be negative. 
4.2.2.3. Exchange-based bequests. 
In a two period model we have three tax instruments: a proportional tax on earnings, interest 
income and inherited wealth with different rates. The overall tax on bequests may or may not 
be higher than that on future consumption. In other words, there is no particular reason to 
believe that the wealth transfer tax is positive. This will depend on the relative magnitude of 
the compensated demand derivatives which determine the overall tax on bequests and the tax 
on future consumption. For example if the demand for attention is much more elastic than that 
for future consumption, the tax on inheritance may turn negative. A particular case of such 
bequests is that of strategic bequests. (Bernheim, et al., 1985). 
4.2.2.4. Accidental bequests 
The accidental bequest case is not much different from the case without bequest. Saving is 
affected by survival probabilities. Accidental transfers are taxed at 100%, without affecting 
the supply of saving. The part of public spending (if any) which exceeds the proceeds of the 
transfer tax is financed through labor and capital income taxes.
16 
4.2.2.5. Preference for wealth 
 The case with preferences for wealth is close to that of paternalistic bequests with one 
exception: here individuals obtain the same utility from saving for retirement and for 
bequests. As in the case of paternalistic bequests, wealth can be viewed as consumption good 
and be taxed accordingly. The issue of laundering does also play some role here
17. Let us 
remember that too much preference for wealth can lead the economy well above the Golden 
Rule. 
Table 3. Desirability of a wealth transfer tax under alternative bequest motives. 
Bequest motive  Laundering   Not laundering 
Dynastic altruism  0/ +  NA 
Joy of giving- net of tax  +  -/+ 
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17  Michel and Pestieau [2007]. 
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Joy of giving-before tax  ++  + 
Exchange based  NA  +/- 
Accidental  NA  100% 
NA: not applicable 
 
Efficiency and equity. 
The arguments developed so far are mostly concerned by efficiency considerations. The 
question dealt with is: given that some revenue has to be collected to finance public spending 
should we include a tax on wealth transfer in our tax toolbox? The answer to this question 
appears to be positive particularly in the case of accidental bequests and of joy of giving for 
before tax transfer. If we add the objective of redistribution, the case of wealth transfer 
taxation becomes even stronger. 
In a recent paper Kopczuk (2009) adds another argument in favor of this tax. He posits that 
wealth concentration has negative social externalities and for that reason a tax that hits the top 





    The theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation tends to assume that individual have 
only one type of bequest motive. In fact real life society consists of individuals with different 
motives; either they exhibit different motives of accumulation or different individuals have 
different motives. Two cases have been studied. First, there is the case of a society with 
individuals being either selfish or altruistic. Second there is the case where the same 
individuals would leave bequests because of altruism and also in case of premature death. In 
those two cases, wealth transfer tax happens to be desirable. 
 
    5. Conclusions 
    Our survey was limited to the normative aspects of wealth taxation and it would seem from 
this overview that the case for not taxing wealth and particularly wealth transfers is rather 
weak. Our basic goal is to finance government services with a tax system that is as efficient, 
fair and painless as possible. On all counts, it is difficult to imagine a better tax than the estate 
tax. Every euro we collect from it is one less euro we need to collect from some other tax that 
is likely to be worse in at least one of these dimensions. 
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    There are a number of questions that we have not dealt with and which explain why wealth 
transfer taxation is today so unpopular that in some countries the political system is 
considering abolishing it. 
    There is first the issue of avoidance and evasion, which not only leads to poor tax yields 
but also lead to strong departures from both vertical and horizontal equity. Related to that, 
there is the issue of tax competition within countries and among countries. In federal states 
one observes a real race to the bottom regarding wealth taxation. In an economic union such 
as the European one there is an increasing tax competition for financial wealth and this 
includes wealth taxation. Another issue pertains to the alleged adverse effect of wealth 
taxation on family businesses. 
    Those three issues have a real political impact and yet there is little evidence on how 
important is their effect. What is sure is that they can be dealt with by reforming the tax on 
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Table 2 Estate. inheritance and gift taxes has a percentage of total taxation 
 
Estate. inheritance and gift taxes  as a percentage of total taxation 
  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2006 
Belgium  1.17  1.06  0.76  0.82  0.59  0.71  0.76  0.97  1.30  1.39 
Denmark  0.65  0.36  0.38  0.44  0.47  0.56  0.47  0.45  0.40  0.43 
Germany  0.22  0.23  0.14  0.18  0.22  0.34  0.26  0.39  0.53  0.46 
Ireland  1.89  1.25  1.12  0.35  0.30  0.39  0.44  0.67  0.50  0.62 
Greece  0.86  1.35  1.00  1.22  0.95  1.23  0.97  0.80  0.42  0.34 
Spain  1.05  0.86  0.79  0.41  0.41  0.42  0.51  0.63  0.74  0.74 
France  0.56  0.72  0.72  0.57  0.61  0.95  0.82  1.07  1.19  1.04 
Italy  0.85  0.64  0.21  0.21  0.23  0.14  0.15  0.20  0.01  0.01 
Luxembourg  0.38  0.48  0.32  0.32  0.27  0.29  0.27  0.27  0.39  0.39 
Netherlands  1.08  0.59  0.37  0.48  0.44  0.50  0.61  0.90  0.86  0.86 
Austria  0.26  0.23  0.19  0.17  0.17  0.14  0.11  0.01  0.14  0.12 
Portugal  2.02  1.47  0.86  0.22  0.83  0.50  0.21  0.25  0.08  0.01 
Finland  0.22  0.24  0.21  0.22  0.27  0.37  0.38  0.59  0.70  0.70 
Sweden  0.39  0.36  0.25  0.21  0.26  0.19  0.16  0.22  0.07  0.01 
United 
Kingdom  2.62  2.01  0.82  0.59  0.69  0.65  0.58  0.62  0.70  0.74 
United States  2.06  1.68  1.45  1.15  0.82  1.00  0.98  1.22  0.90  0.89 
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